Genghis Khan’s Seizing of Battle Initiative Via Flexible Deployment

Dana Pittard is an established Indianapolis executive with an extensive background as a US Army officer. A West Point graduate with a passion for military history, Dana Pittard has authored several papers in his field, including “Genghis Khan and 13th-Century AirLand Battle” (Military Review, July 1986).

The paper examines the US Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine in the context of its most immediate predecessor, the German blitzkrieg, and, going back further, the maneuver warfare strategy practiced by the Mongol Genghis Khan and his warriors. The fundamentals of AirLand Battle are agility, depth, initiative, and synchronization. The emphasis is on harmonious and prompt action by subordinate commanders on the orders of a senior commander.

The similarities of the modern and ancient styles begin with Genghis Khan’s effectiveness in seizing the initiative in all situations through attacking, even when in a defensive posture. With scouts and spies dispatched prior to any invasion, a war of nerves was conducted by the Mongols that succeeded in keeping the enemy from joining together in a unified way. 

In an actual invasion, Genghis Khan arrayed 30,000 to 50,000 men behind light cavalry. This involved a number of columns masked by a broad front, with the formation allowing columns to be quickly deployed in situations where the enemy had greater strength than the Mongols, or when the exact location of troops was unknown. At any given moment, each column was able to decide on whether to confront the enemy or strategically retreat. 

The end result of this strategy was that precious manpower resources were preserved and held in waiting until they could be of most use in battle. At the same time, the enemy was consistently kept guessing as to which direction the main thrust of attack would come from.